We add to the literature that examines the relationship between candidate valence and their policy strategies by arguing that candidates intrinsically value both the policies and the personal character of the winning candidate. In making this argument, we distinguish between two dimensions of candidate valence: strategic valence refers to factors such as name recognition, fundraising ability, and campaigning skills, while character valence is composed of qualities that voters and candidates intrinsically value in office holders, including integrity, competence, and diligence. Our model considers challengers who value both the policies and the character-based valence of the incumbent, and assumes that the incumbent's policy position is fixed by prior commitments. Under these conditions, we show that challengers who are superior to the incumbent in their character-based valence have incentives to moderate their policy positions.
Given that voters' political interests conflict, maximization of institutional quality may be the single objective shared by all congressional voters. He may prefer Republicans and she may prefer Democrats, but they should both favor the able over the incompetent and the trustworthy over the ethically dubious (1995: 1043) .
Candidate and Voter Motivations: The Role of Candidate Character
Previous spatial models that incorporate valence assume that candidates and parties value valence only because of its effect on electoral prospects. 5 Implicitly, such models assume that candidates are indifferent over whether the winning candidate is a trustworthy public servant or an incompetent slacker. This is a questionable assumption, especially for models that analyze policyseeking candidates who seek office in hopes of implementing their desired policies. As elaborated by Wittman (1973 Wittman ( , 1983 , such models posit that candidates have preferences over the policies that the winning candidate implements, because policy outputs are public goods in which the entire electorate (including winning and losing candidates) shares. Yet if candidates have preferences over policies that office holders enact, they plausibly have preferences over the office-holder's competence, integrity, and effort. That is, policy-seeking candidates are also likely to value good character. As Pratt notes, "an inept politician creates pure inefficiencies which are costly to all citizens" ( 2002, .
The intuition that candidates value the character-based qualities of incumbents is supported by several empirical studies. Mondak's (1995) study of incumbent integrity and competence showed that high-quality incumbents were less likely than low-quality incumbents to attract strong challengers. Although Mondak controlled for prior election margins in his analysis, it is possible that challengers were reacting to incumbents' character because of electoral considerations, rather than their taste for good government. In a study based on a survey of strong potential U.S. House candidates, however, Stone, Maisel, and Maestas (2004) show that when potential candidates contemplate a run for the House, they consider not only their electoral prospects but also the character of the incumbent they would have to challenge. The authors demonstrate that, while estimates of incumbent prospects are affected by character, potential challengers were still more likely to enter a race against incumbents judged to be low in character, independent of their election prospects. These results suggest that when potential challengers consider running for a House seat they intrinsically value defeating incumbents who are incompetent, untrustworthy, or otherwise lacking in characterbased valence. That is, potential challengers have a taste for public officials of good character. 6 It seems logical, then, to assume that if potential challengers value and consider character-based attributes when choosing whether to run, then those who ultimately enter the race will weigh these attributes when deciding what policy strategies to adopt.
There is extensive evidence that candidates' strategic attributes such as name recognition, campaign spending, and campaigning skills influence election outcomes (Abramowitz 1988; Gerber 1998; Jacobson 1978 Jacobson , 1990 Green and Krasno 1990; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Canes-Wrone et al. 2002) . By contrast there is only limited empirical research on the electoral impact of candidates'
character-based attributes, and this research reports weak and inconsistent findings. There is little need to argue that character-based valence is of intrinsic interest to voters (Funk 1996 (Funk , 1999 Kinder 
How Candidate Character Influences Challenger Positioning
Previous spatial analyses of candidate positioning have incorporated the effects of candidates' nonpolicy-related attributes via the introduction of valence dimensions that confer an electoral advantage on one of the candidates that is independent of her policy positions (see, e.g., Groseclose 2001; Londregan and Romer 1993; Bruter, Erikson, and Strauss 2008; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2001; Peress 2008; Adams and Merrill 2009; Serra 2010) . However, these studies assume that the competing candidates value these attributes instrumentally, not intrinsically. We extend these models to consider the character-based valence qualities that both candidates and voters intrinsically value, but that may have a limited impact on election outcomes because rank-and-file voters have difficulty observing these candidate attributes. Thus, the candidates' character-based valence attributes may enter into the candidates' but not the voters' utility calculus -precisely the opposite pattern from the one posited in previous valence-based spatial models.
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We analyze candidate policy strategies for scenarios where candidates intrinsically value the winner's character-based attributes. In these scenarios we assume that the voters and the candidates are also policy-seeking as in the models of Donald Wittman (1973 Wittman ( , 1983 . In the first scenario voters cannot observe the candidates' character traits, which therefore do not directly influence the election outcome. In the second set of scenarios the voters can (at least partially) observe the candidates' character traits. 
We assume, following Groseclose (2001) , that the candidates, at the time they select their policy strategies, are uncertain about the election outcome because they cannot perfectly forecast the distribution of voters' Left-Right positions.
10 Specifically, in this illustration the voters and candidates are located on the conventional 1-7 Left-Right scale, and uncertainty about the location of the median voter position is captured by a normal probability distribution centered on 4.0 with standard deviation 0.5. The probability that each candidate is elected is the probability that the calculations, consider two opposing scenarios: In the first, the challenger has much better characterbased valence than the incumbent and therefore has strong incentives to unseat the incumbent because she, the challenger, believes she can provide greater integrity, competence, and effort -qualities that she intrinsically values. As a result, she is willing to make significant policy compromises in order to win the election. In the second scenario, the challenger views the incumbent's character traits positively relative to her own character. Consequently, she does not have character-based motivations to defeat the incumbent and hence the challenger's only public-good benefit from winning office is the ability to enact policies she prefers to the ones the incumbent advocates. 13 Thus, in the second scenario the challenger has weaker incentives to make policy compromises in pursuit of office, and she announces noncentrist policies that more closely reflect her sincere beliefs. By presenting more extreme positions the character-disadvantaged challenger does not concede the election to her opponent, although it is a response to the tradeoffs between balancing her policy and character-based valence utilities, and her prospects for victory. By taking a more extreme position, the challenger enhances her policy utility if she wins. This scenario illustrates how the challenger adjusts her strategy when she values good government in addition to policy outputs.
The strategic logic of our good government result parallels the arguments that Gordon, Huber, and Landa (2007, page 306) develop in their analysis of challengers' entry decisions, in which the authors demonstrate that the opportunity costs that challengers are willing to bear to enter the race decreases as the incumbent's competence-or "type," in their model-improves. Analogously, we argue that challengers are increasingly willing to bear the "costs" of making policy compromiseswhere we define compromise as promising policies that diverge from the challenger's ideal pointwhen the incumbent is of poor character. 
where higher values of α denote that voters are more strongly influenced by candidate j's characterbased valence, and these values are related to how well voters can observe these characteristics.
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Specifically, 0 = α denotes that voters are unable to observe candidates' character-based valences, so that these attributes do not influence voters' decisions (as in the previous illustrative example); 1 0 < <α denotes that voters attach some weight to the candidates' character-based valence, but less weight than the candidates do themselves; 1 = α denotes that voters and candidates attach the same weight to character-based valence. ] [
Why, in this example, does the good government effect break down when voters have sufficient information to weight candidate character heavily in their utility calculus? The intuition is that the challenging candidate's strategy reflects both her desire for good character, and the effects of character-based valence on her electoral prospects -an effect that was absent in the previous example, which assumed that voters do not observe candidate character. To see this, consider a scenario where voters fully observe candidate character and where the challenger's character-based valence is so much better than the incumbent's that she is virtually certain to win election regardless of her policy strategy. In this case the challenger has the leeway to announce her sincere, noncentrist, policy beliefs, secure in the knowledge that she will be elected anyway, and that she will thereby enjoy the public good of high character. Thus, if the challenger's character-based valence advantage is large enough and voters can fully observe these traits, the good government effect may not hold since the challenger will have no incentive to moderate. Note, however, that this counter-example assumes that the voters have sufficient information about the candidates' character traits that these traits significantly influence the election outcome. This suggests in turn that when voters do not acquire sufficient information about the candidates' character-based valences, the good government effect will hold.
Challenger Positioning and Candidate Character: Theoretical Results
We now state and prove the existence of conditions that support the good government result.
The proof of this theorem is given in the on-line appendix. Our results apply to a more general class of situations than those described in our illustrative examples; in particular, we do not require that voters and candidates have quadratic policy loss functions, nor that the probability distribution on the median voter position be normally-distributed. Specifically, let voter i's utility for candidate j be:
where represents voter i's utility for j's position , and is strictly concave and peaks at v i and has continuous partial derivatives of order two. 16 Similarly, let candidate R's utility for the winning candidate w be:
where is strictly concave and peaks at p R and has continuous partial derivatives of order two. Assume that the location of the median voter follows a continuous distribution. In words, the good government result states that when candidate character valences do not weigh too heavily in voters' decisions, then the better the challenger's character-based valence relative to that of the incumbent, the more the challenger is motivated to converge towards the incumbent's position. 17 Given that challengers and incumbents almost invariably locate on opposite sides of the median voter position (we report evidence on this point below), Theorem 1 implies that character-advantaged challengers will tend to moderate their positions toward the district median.
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Simulation Analysis
To substantiate the conclusions suggested by our examples and theoretical results, we simulated 1000 elections in which parameters were chosen randomly from a parameter space. We 
; we included this latter variable in order to determine how the character salience parameter α mediated the effects of character-based valence on R's optimal position. The regression produced the following parameter estimates:
Each estimated coefficient, except for α , is significant at the .001 level, and collectively these parameters explain 35% of the variance in the challenger's optimal positions.
19 Note that, other things being equal, the challenger's optimal strategy moves to the right -and thereby becomes more extreme relative to expectations about the median voter position -as the challenger's relative strategic valence increases, while the negative coefficient on indicates that the challenger can afford to take a more extreme (right-wing) stand if the incumbent is more extreme (in the leftist direction). Note also that these coefficient estimates imply that, for the range of parameters we investigate, candidate R's optimal position will invariably be to the right of 4.0, which is the expectation of the median voter's position -i.e., R's optimal position will always be on the same side 
Challenger Positioning and Candidate Character: Empirical Results
Our illustrative examples and theoretical results suggest The Good Government Hypothesis:
The stronger the challenger's character-based valence relative to that of the incumbent, the more moderate the challenger's ideological position relative to her district. before the November election. 24 We aggregate expert perceptions to the district level so that the unit of analysis throughout is the district and/or candidate.
We chose these data sources for two reasons. First, they allow us to place the positions of both candidates and districts on the same scale. A limitation of much of the empirical literature on congressional elections is that it emphasizes incumbents, because only office-holders can be located based on their roll-call votes or interest-group ratings. In this context "moderation" is measured relative to other incumbents, rather than relative to the district. Likewise, the smaller number of studies that consider challenger placements do so only relative to one another or to incumbents, rather than to the district. We use the informant placements to locate both the incumbent and the challenger on the 7-point liberal-conservative scale. 25 District placements are provided by computing the mean self-placement of CCES survey respondents on the liberal-conservative scale, numbering over 36,000
respondents nationwide. 26 The size of this sample affords the opportunity to build district-based measures of constituency opinion based on unusually large district samples. 27 We note that our informant-based placements locate all the Democratic challengers to the left -and all the Republican challengers to the right -of our estimates of these district medians.
A second strength of the 2006 district-informant study is that it gives us far more detailed measures of strategic and character-based candidate valence than has heretofore been possible from using standard indicators of "candidate quality" such as office-holding experience; indeed to our knowledge this is the only study that satisfies our need for separable empirical measures of candidates' strategic and character-based valence. We questioned informants about candidates' strategic and character-based valence, based on a battery of measures designed to assess the qualities of both incumbents and challengers. 28 All items are scored on seven-point scales ranging from "extremely weak" (-3) through "extremely strong" (+3). For use in our analysis, relative measures of both strategic and character-based quality were computed by subtracting the incumbent's score from the challenger's score on each index. The first column in Table 1 estimates a baseline model, which includes as independent variables the challenger's character valence relative to the incumbent's character valence; the challenger's relative strategic valence; the party of the incumbent; and the incumbent's distance from the mean voter position in the district. Recall our assumption that the incumbent's position is fixed by previous public commitments, including a record of roll call voting in the House (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). The incumbent distance variable is included to allow for the possibility that the incumbent's position relative to the district has an impact on challenger positioning, as suggested by the simulations reported in the preceding section; this variable is not statistically significant.
Column 2 presents estimates for a second model, which includes an additional independent variable, challenger partisans' distance from the district, which is the distance between the mean voter placement in the district and the mean placement of partisans in the district from the challenger's party. 30 We include this variable to control for effects relating to primary elections. Since many challengers were selected in contested party primaries we might expect that more extreme primary electorates (relative to the district as a whole) pull challengers away from the mean voter position in the district. This variable is significant, in the expected direction.
Column 3 presents estimates for a third model, which includes two additional independent variables to control for the strategic entry of challengers: the partisan composition of the district measured as the share of the 2004 presidential vote won by the incumbent's party, and the officeholding experience of the challenger, which is the standard indicator of challenger quality in strategicentry research (Jacobson and Kernell 1983) . We control for these factors because, to the extent that they capture the strategic calculations potential challengers make about entering the race, omission of these variables can generate biased coefficient estimates on the independent variables relating to character-based and strategic valence.
The results in Table 1 support the good government hypothesis: the effect of relative character valence is significant and in the expected direction in all three specifications, whereas the effect of strategic valence is not. 31 This shows that, consistent with our expectations, challengers are influenced by characteristics such as integrity and legislative competence, and not simply by a desire to win office. As noted above, incumbents were rated on average by district experts as stronger in their character than challengers (relative character score = -0.79; sd = 1.27). If we compare challengers who were relatively weak in character-based valence with those who were relatively strong relative to the incumbent (+/-one standard deviation on relative valence), the difference in the expected distance from their districts is about 0.5 units on the 1-7 liberal-conservative scale. That is, the parameter estimate -0.21 on the relative character variable in column 1 of Table 1 implies that, ceterus paribus, challengers whose relative character-based valences were one standard deviation above the mean located an average of over 0.5 units closer to their district than did challengers whose character-based valence rating was low, relative to the incumbent. This is a substantial difference on the seven-point ideological scale.
Finally, the estimated effects of the control variables in our specifications are generally in the expected directions, but they are not necessarily statistically significant. The estimated effects of relative strategic advantage are modest and are not statistically significant. These positive coefficient estimates would indicate that the stronger the challenger's strategic attributes relative to those of the incumbent, the more extreme the challenger's position -a dynamic that would be consistent with our simulation results. The office-holding experience of the challenger, however, does have a statistically significant moderating effect. 32 Similarly, we estimate that smaller and/or more extreme partisan constituencies push challengers away from their district, as critics of the primary system have suggested, and that these effects are of comparable magnitude to the effects of candidates' characterbased valences. 33 However, controlling for these effects does not undermine the good government result in our analysis.
Finally, we note that in comparisons of challengers' versus incumbents' distances from the district, our data show that challengers who enjoy a character advantage over the incumbent locate roughly 0.6 units closer to their districts' mean preferences (on average) than do the incumbents they are trying to unseat, while challengers who have a character deficit relative to the incumbent locate an average of 0.2 units farther away from their districts (on average) than do the incumbents they are opposing. This is striking evidence in support of the good-government effect: character valence is important not only because it is intrinsically valued, but because the strategic logic of relative character drives challengers to provide better policy representation than the incumbents they challenge. 34 The logic of the good-government effect is that candidates with desirable character qualities have incentives to provide good policy representation as well. Thus, constituents can "win twice" by supporting the candidate advantaged on character and who is also likely to provide a better ideological fit with district preferences.
Conclusion
In a series of seminal articles, Donald Wittman (1973, 1977, 1983 ) extended the Downsian model to incorporate the crucial insight that politicians may not focus exclusively on the private goods that come from holding office (i.e., income, prestige, fame), but rather that they also share voters' taste for the public good of the policy outputs ultimately generated by the winning candidate.
Wittman showed that such a model generates fundamentally different predictions from the standard Downsian model, in particular that when there is uncertainty over the election outcome then policyseeking candidates diverge on policy as we observe in real world elections.
Our model extends Wittman's insight on the strategic importance of public goods. If voters value the public good of good government in the form of able, honest, and diligent public servants, then the candidates themselves plausibly value these same attributes in elected officials. And, to the extent that candidates intrinsically value good character they should weigh their own (and their opponent's) character qualities when crafting their election strategies. Previous work has found that potential candidates' decisions about whether to run for office are influenced by their taste for character-based valence (Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004) . We build on this research by presenting theoretical results that this taste for good character motivates challengers with qualities superior to the incumbent to moderate their policy positions toward their district's preferences. Our empirical analyses of congressional challengers' policy strategies confirm this good government effect.
From a theoretical standpoint, the distinction between character-based and strategic valence extends the perspective offered in previous spatial studies that incorporate valence issues without making the distinction between strategic and character valence (e.g., Groseclose 2001; Londregan and Romer 1993; Bruter, Erikson, and Strauss 2008; Peress 2008; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000) . We argue that strategic and character-based valence enter the candidates' strategic calculus in fundamentally different ways: namely, candidates value strategic valence instrumentally, as assumed in previous studies, but they value character-based valence both instrumentally and intrinsically as a public good. Our empirical results support this proposition.
Our findings have positive implications for representative democracy. To the extent that challenging candidates who are especially able, honest, and hard-working are prepared to moderate their policies in pursuit of office, this enhances the likelihood that voters will elect high-character challengers and benefit from the quality of leadership that results. Furthermore, by moderating their policy strategies, these high-character challengers move closer to the median voter's expected position and thereby provide superior policy representation to their district. These results are not contingent on voters' abilities to observe the candidates' character-based attributes. Indeed we have
shown that the good-government result is strongest in situations where voters possess little or no information about the candidates' character-based valence. Given that extensive research documents that voters often possess little information about congressional candidates (Jacobson 2009 122-6) , particularly challengers, it is reassuring that so long as candidates themselves value good government they are motivated to adopt policy strategies that enhance the likelihood that voters will receive the good government that results from competence, integrity, and diligence in their leaders, and the good policy representation that results from policy moderation over extremism. position is captured by a normal probability distribution centered on 4.0 with standard deviation 0.5. The figure plots R's optimal policy strategies for three different assumptions about the weights that voters attach to candidate character: 3 Incumbents also should value character valence in the winner, but our focus is on challengers because incumbents are more constrained by their prior legislative voting record in the positions they take on issues. 4 To our knowledge, the assumption that candidates intrinsically value good government has not been incorporated into a spatial model of candidate competition, although Gordon, Huber, and Landa (2007) develop a model of challenger entry, rather than a spatial model, in which challengers intrinsically value the office-holder's competence. 5 We recognize that character-based valence may also enhance electoral prospects since voters may perceive good character qualities in candidates (an assumption we incorporate into our model below).
The fact that character enhances a candidate's election prospects, however, does not gainsay its intrinsic value.
]
6 We note that this desire to defeat dishonest incumbents should extend even to challengers who are themselves untrustworthy. We expect that challengers -whether they are honest or dishonest -would prefer that the incumbent not loot the treasury, or appoint incompetent cronies to key positions, or accept bribes, as this type of dishonest behavior by elected officials creates a public "bad" which harms the challenger, even if s/he is dishonest. 7 Note that in the Gordon, Huber, and Landa (2007) model of challenger entry candidates possess more information about their own (and their opponent's) personal qualities than the voters do. 8 This assumption is typically justified on the grounds that politicians project that, in future elections, retrospective voters will punish office-holders who violate their pre-election policy promises, and that these projected future electoral reverses will in turn generate policy losses that exceed the policy gains office-holders can achieve by reneging on their promises during the current inter-election period. , so that R and D are located symmetrically with respect to the center point 4.0 of the probability distribution for the median voter position, then R's probability of winning the election is only about 0.25 (assuming, as we do here, that the probability distribution on the median voter is normallydistributed with standard deviation = 0.5). 14 Our good government result also relates to Groseclose's (2001) 'Moderating Front-runner' and 'Extremist Underdog' results, which state that policy-seeking candidates who possess valence advantages (relative to their opponent) are motivated to moderate their policies, while those that suffer from valence disadvantages are motivated to shift to more radical positions. Groseclose's results apply to the "standard" valence-based spatial model in which the voters are moved by the candidates' valence attributes but the candidates themselves do not intrinsically value these attributes -factors that we have labeled strategic valence effects (name recognition, campaign spending, etc.).
Our good government result suggests that the strategic dynamics that Groseclose identifies may extend to a different type of candidate traits, namely character-based valence attributes that the candidates value intrinsically but that voters cannot easily observe. 15 Note, however, that the character salience parameter α also reflects the intrinsic importance that voters assign to the candidates' character-based valence, i.e. some voters may not weigh candidate character very heavily even if they can fully observe it, because they believe that candidate character is not intrinsically important compared to the policies the winner will implement once in office. 22 We note that this hypothesis states that character-advantaged challengers shift towards the district median, while Theorem 1 states that character-advantaged challengers shift towards the incumbent's position. However given that real world challengers and incumbents virtually always locate on opposite sides of the district median, in practice Theorem 1 and the Good Government Hypothesis are equivalent. This is the case with the data on congressional challengers we analyze below, in which all challengers were on the opposite side of the district median from the incumbent. 23 The actual N in our analyses (N=74) is smaller due to the fact that open seats and districts without challengers are dropped. 24 Our response rate was 21%, and the average number of informants per district was 6.2. 25 We have re-estimated all of the specifications that we report below (see Table 1 ) using CCES respondents' candidate placements in place of the informant placements, and these analyses support substantive conclusions that are identical to those we report below. 26 The CCES common-content survey used a 5-point liberal-conservative scale. 27 The mean number of respondents per district in the sample districts is 85.8. 28 The strategic-valence items are: ability to raise funds from others; ability to fund own campaign; current name recognition in district; ability to attract attention; ability to be persuasive in public; ability to run a professional campaign; overall strength as a campaigner. The character valence items are: personal integrity; ability to work well with other leaders; ability to find solutions to problems; competence; grasp of the issues; qualifications to hold public office; overall strength as a public servant. We confirmed the distinction between the two dimensions of valence by principal components analysis.
33 29 The mean difference between challengers and incumbents indicates that incumbents had a larger advantage on strategic valence (the mean difference score is -2.45) than on character valence (mean difference = -0.79). For comparisons between challengers and incumbents on individual items, see Stone and Simas (2010: 375) . 30 Based on CCES respondents' ideological self-placements. The distance on the Left-Right scale is between the position of all respondents in the district and those who identify with the challenger's party. 31 If character-advantaged challengers moderate their positions due to office-seeking motivations (i.e., if these candidates seek to minimize their policy differences with the incumbent so that voters choose based primarily based on valence differences), then we would also expect to find challengers who benefit from strategic valence advantages to moderate their positions. However our coefficient estimates do not support this latter expectation. Thus, our model can explain -as previous models cannot -why challengers moderate their positions when their character-based valence improves, but do not moderate their positions as their strategic valence improves. We thank two anonymous reviewers for raising the issue of challengers' office-seeking motivations. 32 To the extent that previous office-holding experience is an indicator of superior competence or diligence over and above what is captured by the district informants' character ratings, this moderating effect is consistent with the Good Government Hypothesis, i.e., it implies that highcharacter challengers (as indicated by their previously having held office) tend to moderate their policy strategies. 33 In the Strategic Entry Model, both challengers' partisans' distance from the district and partisan composition of the district (defined as the district presidential vote share for the incumbent's party) are statistically significant. The coefficient estimate on the [Challengers' partisans' distance from district] variable in the Strategic Entry Model (column 3 in Table 1 ) is 0.86 and the standard deviation on the values of this variable is 0.33, so that if we compare districts where the challenger's partisans are moderate relative to the district median to districts where these partisans are relatively extreme (+/-one standard deviation on the [challenger's partisans' distance from district] variable), the difference in the challengers' expected distance from their district is about 0.57 units on the 1-7 liberal-conservative scale. This is similar to the estimated effect on challenger positioning of the challenger's relative character valence. Similar computations on the effects of district presidential vote share suggest that this variable exerts comparable effects on challenger positioning. We also note that when the analysis is run separately for Democratic and Republican challengers, both these variables are highly significant for Republicans but not for Democrats, suggesting that partisan ideology may have more effect in Republican than Democratic primaries. 34 We have estimated the equations presented in Table 1 using the relative proximity of the challenger and incumbent to the district, rather than the proximity of the challenger to the district, as the dependent variable. The effects of relative personal quality are, if anything, stronger in that setup than the one reported in Table 1. 
